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ONCE, TWICE, FOUR TIMES A FELON: NORTH CAROLINA'S
UNCONSTITUTIONAL RECIDIVIST STATUTES
I.

INTRODUCTION

Melissa Marvin downed three shots of booze at one bar and two
margarita "grandes" at another.' The thirty-year-old then climbed into
her sport utility vehicle and sped through traffic.2 Marvin changed
lanes frequently while resting her left foot upon the dashboard.3 She
ran a red light and plowed into a small car carrying five teenagers,
killing four of them.4
Marvin is classified as a habitual impaired driver under North
Carolina law. 5 A habitual impaired driver who subsequently drives
while intoxicated is subject to felony punishment according to North
Carolina law. 6 As a result of her actions, Marvin received a sixty-year
sentence in January 2001.1 Melissa Marvin is one of many habitual
impaired drivers who has been subjected to North Carolina's attempt
to prevent recidivist criminals from continuing to endanger society.
This article will examine actions taken by the North Carolina legislature to address problems posed by recidivist criminal behavior. In
particular, the constitutional standing of North Carolina's habitual
misdemeanor assault and habitual impaired driving statutes will be
evaluated. In order to provide an adequate discussion, the history and
general principles of recidivism will be addressed. In addition, the
impact of recidivist statutory trends upon constitutional guarantees of
double jeopardy will be analyzed. Finally, the article will explain that
North Carolina's habitual misdemeanor statutes are standing upon teetering constitutional ground.

1. Marjorie Mellott, Drunk Driving and the Law, Uanuary 13, 2000) available at
http://www.vvcaps-vvsk.com/DWI.html.
2. Id.
3. Id.

4. Id.
5. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-138.5 (1999).

6. See id.
7. Marjorie Mellott, Drunk Driving and the Law, (January 13, 2000) available at
http://www.vvcaps-vvsk.com/DWI.html.
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RECIDIVIST HISTORY

Recidivism is defined as the tendency to relapse into a habit of
multiple criminal offenses." Dating back to colonial times, American
legal systems have implemented statutes that punish recidivists more
severely than first-time offenders.9 In Rummel v. Estelle, the United
States Supreme Court summarized the rationale supporting recidivist
statutes as follows:
Its primary goals are to deter repeat offenders and, at some point in
the life of one who repeatedly commits criminal offenses serious
enough to be punished as felonies, to segregate that person from the
rest of society for an extended period of time. This segregation and its
duration are based not merely on that person's most recent offense but
also on the propensities he has demonstrated over a period of time
during which he has been convicted of and sentenced for other
crimes. 1o

Presently, all fifty states, as well as the Federal Government, have
enacted recidivist statutes."
III.

RECIDIVIST STATUTORY METHODS

A wide variety of statutory methods for dealing with the problems
of recidivism exist. 2 The challenge presented by recidivist legislation
is justifying the habitual charge as solely a punishment-enhancing status, while at the same time, limiting the prejudicial effect caused by the
required proof of prior convictions. Commentators generally categorize recidivist statutes according to the procedural methods employed
when prosecuting violations of the statutes. 1 3 Recidivist statutes are
generalized into three procedural categories: the English or Connecticut model, the supplementary proceeding method, and the common
law method.1 4 Each category represents a different approach to the
process of introducing the existence of prior convictions into the trial
for the current offense.
The English or Connecticut approach to recidivist legislation
involves a bifurcated procedure that provides separate hearings to
determine the issues of guilt in the current offense and the existence of
1276 (7th ed. 1999).
9. Parks v. Rally, 506 U.S. 20, 26-27 (1992).
10. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 284 (1980).
8. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

11.
12.
13.
14.

Parks, 506 U.S. at 26-27.
Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 556 (1967).
Recidivist Procedures, 40 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 332, 333 (1965).
Id.
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prior convictions. 1 5 In order to advance the separation of the proceedings, the indictment (which includes both the current charge and the
charge of qualifying as a habitual offender) is divided into two parts. 16
Following conviction of the present offense, the portion of the indictment containing the habitual offender charge is read to the defendant,
who is then required to plead to the recidivist allegation. 1 7 If he
acknowledges the prior convictions, he is sentenced in accordance
with the recidivist statute.1 8 If he denies the prior convictions, the
defendant is entitled to a jury trial on the issue of his prior
convictions. 19
A second approach to recidivist legislation is referred to as the
supplementary proceeding method.2 0 This method abolishes the need
to prove prior convictions at the trial for the current offense. 2 '
Instead, a separate, subsequent hearing is required to prove the existence of prior convictions. 22 If the convictions are stipulated or proven
at the subsequent hearing, the defendant will qualify for sentencing
pursuant to the recidivist statute.2 3
The common law method is the most commonly recognized procedure. 2 4 This method for applying recidivist statutes requires allegations and proof of past convictions at the current trial.2 5 North
Carolina recidivist legislation, such as the Habitual Felons Act, the
habitual misdemeanor assault statute, and the habitual impaired driving statute, are drafted and applied using the common law procedural
method.2 6 This procedure subjects the defendant to heightened jury
prejudice when facing the current charge due to the introduction of
prior criminal convictions.

15. Id. at 333-334.
16. Id. at 333.
17. Id. at 334.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 335.
21. Id. at 333.
22. Id. at 336.

23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 556 (1967).
26. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-7.1 (2000); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-33.2 (1999); N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 20-138.5 (1999).
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NORTH CAROLINA RECIDIVISM

Habitual Felons Act

North Carolina's most prominent recidivist enactment is embodied in its Habitual Felons Act. 2 7 Habitual felons are defined as those
persons who have been convicted of three felonies. 28 The manifest
intent of the General Assembly in enacting the Habitual Felons Act was
to insure lengthier sentences for those persons who repeatedly violate
the criminal laws of this State. 29 Nowhere in the Act is there any indication that it was intended to apply only to those persons who repeatedly violate the same criminal law, and the courts have declined to
write any such requirement into the law.30 Courts have justified the
constitutionality of the Habitual Felons Act 3 1 by holding that the statute creates a fictional punishment enhancement status rather than a
substantive, independent offense.
B.

Habitual Impaired Driving

For one of every 190 miles driven in North Carolina in 1998, a
legally intoxicated person (blood alcohol level > .08) sat behind the
27. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-7.1 (2000).
28. Id.
29. See State v. Hodge, 112 N.C. App. 462, 469 (1993).
30. Id.
31. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-7.1 (1999). Persons defined as habitual felons.
Any person who has been convicted of or pled guilty to three felony offenses
in any federal court or state court in the United States or combination thereof
is declared to be an habitual felon. For the purpose of this Article, a felony
offense is defined as an offense which is a felony under the laws of the State
or other sovereign wherein a plea of guilty was entered or a conviction was
returned regardless of the sentence actually imposed. Provided, however, that
federal offenses relating to the manufacture, possession, sale and kindred
offenses involving intoxicating liquors shall not be considered felonies for
the purposes of this Article. For the purposes of this Article, felonies
committed before a person attains the age of 18 years shall not constitute
more than one felony. The commission of a second felony shall not fall
within the purview of this Article unless it is committed after the conviction
of or plea of guilty to the first felony. The commission of a third felony shall
not fall within the purview of this Article unless it is committed after the
conviction of or plea of guilty to the second felony. Pleas of guilty to or
convictions of felony offenses prior to July 6, 1967, shall not be felony
offenses within the meaning of this Article. Any felony offense to which a
pardon has been extended shall not for the purpose of this Article constitute
a felony. The burden of proving such pardon shall rest with the defendant
and the State shall not be required to disprove a pardon.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol24/iss1/6
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wheel.3 2 Each year 1,505 traffic deaths occur on North Carolina's
highways. 33 Of those 1,505 motor vehicle fatalities, 536 are alcoholrelated.3 4 Statistics show that an alarming 35.6 percent of all traffic
fatalities in North Carolina involve alcohol.35
Not surprisingly, driving under the influence was the offense
most frequently cited among adults in the 14.6 million arrests for
criminal infractions in 1994.36 An estimated 513,200 offenders were
on probation or incarcerated for driving while intoxicated in 1997." 7
In 1999, one of every nine intoxicated drivers involved in fatal crashes
in North Carolina had been convicted of driving while intoxicated
38
within three years of the fatal accident.
Unquestionably, the legal and social consequences of impaired
driving are severe. Perhaps the most alarming statistic regarding
impaired driving is that in North Carolina, approximately one-third of
drivers who were arrested or convicted for DWIs from 1990 to 1992
had previously been convicted of alcohol-impaired driving.3 9 In
response, the North Carolina Legislature has passed legislation aimed
at curbing, if not eliminating, the problems presented by those who
drive while under the influence of alcohol or narcotics. More specifically, North Carolina has adopted legislation aimed at preventing and
severely punishing repeat offenders.
In 1989, the North Carolina Legislature passed North Carolina
General Statute § 20-138.5.4" Titled the "Habitual Impaired Driving
Statute," it specifically punishes those who repeatedly drive while
intoxicated. 41 To be convicted of habitual impaired driving, one must
32. Mothers Against Drunk Driving, State-By-State Traffic Fatalities (1999),
available at http://www.madd.org/madd/stats/0,1056,1303,00.html.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Center For Disease Control, Reduction in alcohol-related traffic fatalitiesUnited States (1990-1992), available at http://wonder.cdc.gov/wonder/prevguid/
m0032985/m0032985.asp#Table_1.
40. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-138.5 (1999).
41. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-138.5 (1999). Habitual impaired driving.
(a) A person commits the offense of habitual impaired driving if he drives
while impaired as defined in G.S. 20-138.1 and has been convicted of
three or more offenses involving impaired driving as defined in G.S. 204.01(24a) within seven years of the date of this offense.
(b) A person convicted of violating this section shall be punished as a Class
F felon and shall be sentenced to a minimum active term of not less than
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currently face a charge of driving while impaired and must have been
convicted of three or more offenses involving impaired driving within
seven years of the current offense.42 Defendants convicted of habitual
impaired driving are punished as Class F felons and are sentenced to a
minimum active term of not less than one year of imprisonment.4 3
The justification for elevating what would be a misdemeanor offense to
felony status is based upon the repetitive nature of the defendant's
conduct.
C.

Habitual Misdemeanor Assault

North Carolina reported 71,346 simple assault convictions in
1998. 4 4 North Carolina also reported 28,637 aggravated assault convictions in 1998. 41 Undoubtedly, the incidents of assault within North
Carolina are a cause for growing concern. In response to this concern,
the North Carolina Legislature enacted the habitual misdemeanor
12 months of imprisonment, which shall not be suspended. Sentences
imposed under this subsection shall run consecutively with and shall
commence at the expiration of any sentence being served.
(c) An offense under this section is an implied consent offense subject to the
provisions of G.S. 20-16.2.
(d) A person convicted under this section shall have his license permanently
revoked.
(e) If a person is convicted under this section, the motor vehicle that was
driven by the defendant at the time the defendant committed the offense
of impaired driving becomes property subject to forfeiture in accordance
with the procedure set out in G.S. 20-28.2. In applying the procedure set
out in that statute, an owner or a holder of a security interest is
considered an innocent party with respect to a motor vehicle subject to
forfeiture under this subsection if any of the following applies:
(1) The owner or holder of the security interest did not know and had no
reason to know that the defendant had been convicted within the
previous seven years of three or more offenses involving impaired
driving.
(2) The defendant drove the motor vehicle without the consent of the
owner or the holder of the security interest.
42. Id. at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-138.5(a) (1999).
43. Id. at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-138.5(b) (1999).
44. North Carolina Department of Crime and Public Safety Control, Simple Assault
by Month 1998-1999 (June 15, 2000), availableat http:sbi2.jus.state.nc.us/crp/public/
1999/1999htm.
45. North Carolina Department of Crime and Public Safety Control, Aggravated
Assault by Month 1998-1999 (June 15, 2000), available at http://sbi2.jus.state.nc.us/
crp/public/ 1999/1999.htm.
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assault statute to provide enhanced punishment for recidivist
behavior.4 6
The habitual misdemeanor assault statute punishes qualifying
defendants as Class H felons.47 If the defendant presently commits
offenses of either aggravated or simple assault, and has previously
been convicted of five or more misdemeanor offenses (two of which
were assaults), he qualifies for punishment under the recidivist statute. 48 Again, the justification for elevating the misdemeanor conduct
to a felony offense is based upon the repetitive nature of the defendant's criminal conduct.
V.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY

The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution guarantees that no person shall "be subject
for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." 49 The
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause extends the protection
provided by the Double Jeopardy Clause to state prosecutions.5 ° In
addition, the North Carolina Supreme Court has held that the North
Carolina Constitution incorporates a prohibition against double
jeopardy.5 1
The Double Jeopardy Clause protects defendants against three
classifications of prosecutions. 52 First, the clause protects against a
second prosecution after acquittal for the same offense.5 3 Secondly, it
protects against a second prosecution after conviction for the same
offense.5 4 Finally, the double jeopardy clause protects against multiple
punishments for the same offense.5 5
46. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-33.2 (1999). Habitual misdemeanor assault.

A person commits the offense of habitual misdemeanor assault if that person
violates any of the provisions of G.S. 14-33(c) or G.S. 14-34 and has been
convicted of five or more prior misdemeanor convictions, two of which were
assaults. A person convicted of violating this section is guilty of a Class H

felony.
47. Id.
48. Id.

49. U.S. Const. amend. V.
50. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 438 (1970).
51. State v. Brunson, 327 N.C. 244, 247-249 (1990).
52. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977).
53. State v. Gardner, 315 N.C. 444, 451 (1986).

54. Id.
55. Id.
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2001
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RECIDIVISM AND DOUBLE JEOPARDY

Habitual or recidivist statutes have faced repeated constitutional
challenges. However, statutes that enhance punishment on the basis
of subsequent convictions for identical offenses and statutes that
enhance penalties on the basis of any prior felony convictions have
been repeatedly upheld against almost every imaginable constitutional
challenge.5 6 Courts have developed a fictional distinction between
actual punishment and enhancement of punishment in order to rationalize the constitutionality of recidivist statutes. Courts apply this distinction to conclude that increased punishment authorized by
recidivist statutes does not punish a defendant for crimes previously
committed.5 7 Instead, recidivist statutes authorize states to punish
current offenses more severely based upon the fact that a particular
defendant has demonstrated the propensity to repeatedly disrupt
society.
According to the substantive offense-status distinction, habitual or
recidivist statutes merely convey a punishment enhancement status
upon qualifying defendants.5 9 Generally, habitual offender statutes
can only act to convey the punishment enhancement status and cannot
independently support a criminal sentence.6 ° Since the enhanced
punishment imposed for the latter offense is to be viewed as sentence
enhancement status rather than new jeopardy or additional penalty for
prior crimes, double jeopardy guarantees are not considered violated. 6 ' In other words, defendants are not punished again for prior
criminal acts; rather, they are being punished more severely because of
their prior criminal convictions. Therefore, recidivist statutes are
determined to be consistent with double jeopardy guarantees because
they convey a sentence enhancing status and not a substantive offense.
The important distinction between status and substantive offense
recidivist statutes will be further examined later in this commentary.

56. See Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-560 (1967).
57. Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673, 676-677 (1895).
58. Id.
59. See State v. Allen, 292 N.C. 431 (1977) ("[bleing a habitual felon is a status
justifying an increased punishment for the principal felony").
60. Richardson v. Stainer, 15 F.3d 1088, 1993 WL 5343000 (9th Cir. 1993)
(unpublished) ("[In general, a charge under a habitual criminal statute does not state
a separate offense.").
61. United States v. Nichols, 511 U.S. 738, 747 (1994).
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FEDERAL RECIDIVIST JURISPRUDENCE

Federal courts have had numerous opportunities to determine the
constitutional standing of recidivist statutes. The following is a brief
sampling of cases that demonstrate the rationale employed in upholding recidivist statutes. This sampling is not exhaustive, but it is sufficient to demonstrate the consistent reasoning that comprises federal
recidivist jurisprudence. As the following cases show, the rationale for
holding recidivist statutes constitutional in the face of double jeopardy
clauses is centered on the substantive-status distinction.
In Baker v. Duckworth, the Seventh Circuit addressed the issue of
whether Indiana's habitual offender statute violated guarantees provided by prohibitions against double jeopardy. 62 The court recognized
that Indiana's habitual offender act did not create a separate crime.6 3
Instead, the court held that the habitual offender statute created a punishment enhancement status. 64 Consequentially, the court held that
the use of prior convictions for sentence enhancement purposes did
not violate the guaranty against double jeopardy because the defendant is not twice tried or punished for the same offense.6 5
In Davis v. Bennett, the Eighth Circuit was presented with the
issue of whether the Texas habitual offender statute violated guaranteed protections against double jeopardy. 66 In rejecting double jeopardy arguments, the court found that Bennett's prior convictions were
used only for enhancing the sentence of his current offense.6 7 The
court held that double jeopardy protections were not violated since the
prior conviction was used for punishment enhancement rather than as
an element of a subsequent crime.6 8
Several state courts have also held that recidivist proceedings do
not violate the guarantees against double jeopardy. In McMannis v.
Mohn, the West Virginia Supreme Court held that "[s]ince a recidivist
proceeding does not involve a separate substantive offense, double
'69 Simijeopardy principles do not bar a retrial of that proceeding.
larly, in State v. Torrez, the Arizona Court of Appeals held that recidivist statutes requiring proof of prior convictions do not violate
guarantees against double jeopardy when the effect of such statutes is
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Baker v. Duckworth, 752 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 304.
Id.
Id.
Davis v. Bennett, 400 F.2d 279 (8th Cir. 1968).
Id. at 282.
Id.
McMannis v. Mohn, 254 S.E.2d 805, 813 (W. Va. 1979).
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to create a punishment enhancement status. 70 Finally, in State v. Carl-

son, the Supreme Court of Alaska held that "[hlabitual criminal statutes have been found not violative of the fifth amendment prohibition
against double jeopardy, because these statutes do not create a separate offense but merely enhance the punishment for the latest
offense. 7 1
VIII.

NORTH CAROLINA RECIDIVIST JURISPRUDENCE

North Carolina courts have also interpreted state recidivist statutes in the face of constitutional challenges on numerous occasions.
Perhaps the most notable are the supreme court's pronouncements on
the constitutionality of the Habitual Felons Act. In State v. Todd, the
North Carolina Supreme Court held that the Legislature is not constitutionally prohibited from enhancing punishment for habitual offenders. 72 The Court also concluded that the Legislature acted within
constitutionally permissible bounds in enacting legislation designed to
identify habitual criminals and in authorizing enhanced
punishment.7 3
In State v. Allen, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that
being a habitual felon is not a crime, but a status. 7 4 Attaining such
status subjects a person subsequently convicted of a crime to an
increased punishment for that crime. 75 The status itself, standing
alone, will not support a criminal sentence. 76 Similar to federal precedent, North Carolina courts have construed recidivist statutes as consistent with constitutional guarantees because such statutes merely
convey individuals with a status and do not independently create a
substantive criminal offense.
The Habitual Felons Act of North Carolina and similar recidivist
statutes across the nation have been declared consistent with constitutional guarantees because they merely establish a punishment
enhancement status. This rationale reconciles such statutes with
double jeopardy protections in that criminals are not punished twice
for their crimes; instead, criminal sentences are enhanced due to
propensities for recidivism. North Carolina courts have upheld similar
70. State v. Torrez, 687 P.2d 1292, 1294 (Ariz. 1984).

71. State v. Carlson, 500 P.2d 26, 31 (Alaska 1977).
72. State v. Todd, 313 N.C. 110, 117-118 (1985).
73. Id. at 117.
74. State v. Allen, 292 N.C. 431 (1977). Accord State v. Thomas, 82 N.C. App. 682
(1986), cert. denied, 320 N.C. 637 (1987); State v. Penland, 89 N.C. App. 350 (1988).
75. Id. at 435 (quoting Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 556 (1967)).
76. Id.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol24/iss1/6
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habitual misdemeanor statutes based upon the same rationale set forth
above. However, recent case law indicates an important distinction
that places the habitual misdemeanor criminal statutes in violation of
constitutional guarantees.
Few cases have addressed the constitutionality of North Carolina's
habitual misdemeanor offender statutes. Even in the face of little precedent, the substance, construction, and impact of such statutes
become clearer with each new decision. The following discussion evaluates cases contributing to the evolution of habitual misdemeanor precedent. In turn, that precedent is slowly indicating that these statutes
are on a collision course with the constitutional guarantee of protection against double jeopardy.
A sharp distinction exists between the habitual impaired driving
or the habitual misdemeanor assault statute and the Habitual Felons
Act. North Carolina courts have construed state habitual misdemeanor criminal statutes to create and independently support a substantive criminal offense. 7 7 In contrast, precedent defines the Habitual
Felons Act to merely convey a punishment enhancement status upon
qualified defendants.7 8 Unlike the habitual misdemeanor criminal
offenses, the Habitual Felons Act is incapable of creating or independently supporting a substantive criminal offense. 79 As will be demonstrated, this substantive offense-status distinction has produced
significant effects on the constitutionality of habitual misdemeanor
criminal statutes.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals first addressed the substantive offense-status distinction in State v. Priddy.8 ° Priddy asserted that
her charge of habitual impaired driving did not constitute a substantive felony offense, but merely operated as a punishment enhancement
under statute. 8 ' Priddy moved to dismiss the habitual impaired driving charge because habitual impaired driving created only a punishment enhancement status. There was no underlying felony to make
82
original jurisdiction in superior court proper.
The primary issue before the court was whether the trial court
erred in dismissing the charge of habitual impaired driving for lack of
77. See State v. Priddy, 115 N.C. App. 547, 549 (1994). See also State v. Smith,
139 N.C. App. 209, 215 (2000), appeal dismissed, 353 N.C. 277 (2000).
78. State v. Allen, 292 N.C. 431(1977). Accord State v. Thomas, 82 N.C. App. 682
(1986), cert. denied, 320 N.C. 637 (1987); State v. Penland, 89 N.C. App. 350 (1988).
79. Id.
80. State v. Priddy, 115 N.C. App. 547 (1994), disc. review denied, 337 N.C. 805
(1994).
81. Id. at 548.
82. Id.
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jurisdiction.83 The State contended superior court jurisdiction was
proper because the offense of habitual impaired driving constituted a
separate substantive felony. 84 The court relied upon statutory language analysis in order to determine whether habitual impaired driving conveyed a status or created a substantive felony offense8 s5 The
court determined that the legislature intended to create a substantive
felony offense because the statutory language set out the required elements of proof, specifically defined the applicable punishment, and
explicitly provided that a person "commits the offense of habitual
impaired driving." 6
In State v. Baldwin,8 7 the Court of Appeals relied upon the precedent established in Priddy"' to determine that a conviction for habitual
impaired driving may serve as a predicate felony for enhancement to
habitual felon status under North Carolina General Statute § 14-7.1.89
One of the three predicate felony offenses used to charge Baldwin as a
habitual felon was habitual impaired driving. 90 Baldwin contended
that the use of his habitual impaired driving conviction to elevate him
to the status of a habitual felon was improper because habitual
impaired driving did not create a substantive felony offense. 9 1 The
court reiterated the language of Priddy9 2 by stating that "[h]abitual
93
impaired driving is a substantive felony offense."
IX.

APPLES AND ORANGES

The importance of the substantive offense-status distinction and
the relevant constitutional implications this distinction creates is best
recognized in State v. Smith.9 4 Smith was convicted of two counts of
habitual misdemeanor assault and of being a habitual felon.9 5 The
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 549.
86. Id. (emphasis added).
87. State v. Baldwin, 117 N.C. App. 713 (1995).
88. State v. Priddy, 115 N.C. App. 547 (1994), disc. review denied, 337 N.C. 805
(1994).
89. State v. Baldwin, 117 N.C. App. 713 (1995).
90. Id. at 716.
91. Id.
92. State v. Priddy, 115 N.C. App. 547 (1994), disc. review denied, 337 N.C. 805
(1994).
93. State v. Baldwin, 117 N.C. App. 713 (1995).
94. State v. Smith, 139 N.C. App. 209 (2000), appeal dismissed, 353 N.C. 277
(2000).
95. Id. at 211.
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North Carolina Court of Appeals relied upon the similarities between
the habitual impaired driving and the habitual misdemeanor assault
statutes in order to reject Smith's contention that the habitual misdemeanor assault statute served only as a punishment status and not a
substantive felony offense.9 6
The court also rationalized the constitutionality of the habitual
misdemeanor assault statute in light of ex postfacto challenges by relying on North Carolina Supreme Court pronouncements of the constitutionality of the Habitual Felons Act. 9 7 The supreme court held in
State v. Todd 9" that the Habitual Felons Act did not violate ex post facto
principles because it did not punish the defendant for "previous conduct, but for his current conduct to a greater degree, due to his previous similar offenses." 99 The Smith' 0 0 Court analyzed the habitual
misdemeanor assault statute based upon the Supreme Court's analysis
in Todd.' 0 ' The Smith' °2 court held the habitual misdemeanor assault
statute not to be in violation of ex post facto principles because the
statute does not impose punishment for the previous crimes. Instead,
it imposes an enhanced punishment for behavior occurring after the
enactment of the statute due to the repetitive nature of the defendant's
behavior.

10 3

While concurring in the result in Smith,' 0 4 Judge Wynn noted the
possible constitutional deficiencies of both the habitual misdemeanor
assault and the habitual impaired driving statutes.10 5 Specifically,
Wynn recognized the analytical flaws in relying on the supreme
court's determination of the constitutionality of the Habitual Felons
Act to conclude that the habitual misdemeanor assault and habitual
impaired driving statutes survive constitutional scrutiny.10 6 Wynn
96. State v. Smith, 139 N.C. App. 209, 213-214 (2000), appeal dismissed, 353 N.C.
277 (2000).
97. Id. at 214.
98. State v. Todd, 313 N.C. 110 (1985).
99. Id. at 117.
100. State v. Smith, 139 N.C. App. 209 (2000), appeal dismissed, 353 N.C. 277

(2000).
101. State v. Todd, 313 N.C. 110 (1985).
102. State v. Smith, 139 N.C. App. 209 (2000), appeal dismissed, 353 N.C. 277

(2000).
103. Id. at 214-215 (Wynn, J., concurring).
104. State v. Smith, 139 N.C. App. 209, 220-222 (2000), appeal dismissed, 353 N.C.
277 (2000) (Wynn, J., concurring).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 221.
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explained that such analysis leads to the comparison of "apples and
oranges."' 0 7
The essence of this troublesome comparison lies in the fact that
the Habitual Felons Act creates a status offense that will not independently support a criminal sentence. In contrast, the habitual misdemeanor assault and habitual impaired driving statutes create
substantive felony offenses that will independently support a criminal
sentence. The Habitual Felons Act requires that the defendant's prior
convictions be proven by the state in the sentencing phase. However,
predicate offenses are not true elements of the offense. Predicate
offenses become relevant only when sentences for the underlying felony are imposed.108
On the other hand, the habitual misdemeanor assault and the
habitual impaired driving statutes require that the prior convictions be
essential elements of the substantive offense. 10 9 Violations of double
jeopardy protections arise since these statutes are dependent upon
prior convictions. Judicial precedent has erroneously determined the
constitutionality of these statutes by using a rationale that supports
the validity of the Habitual Felons Act. These statutes are inherently
different. Yet, the validity of one turns upon the constitutionality of
the other.
X.

STATUTORY ANALYSIS

Only one North Carolina case has presented a direct challenge to
the constitutionality of the habitual impaired driving or the habitual
misdemeanor assault statutes based upon double jeopardy principles. 110 In Vardiman, the North Carolina Court of Appeals rejected the
substantive-status distinction and upheld the defendant's habitual
impaired driving conviction."' The rationale of the court was that
Vardiman was merely having the punishment of his current offense
enhanced rather than being convicted of a separate, substantive
offense. 1 2 However, developing precedent and the expression of constitutional concern by the North Carolina Court of Appeals suggest
that the time has come to obtain a definitive ruling from the North
Carolina Supreme Court. Once squarely faced with the double jeop107. Id.
108. Id. at 221-222.
109. Id.

110. See State v. Vardiman, 552 S.E.2d 697 (2001).
111. Id.
112. Id.
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ardy issue, the supreme court should recognize the habitual misdemeanor statutes as unconstitutional.
The North Carolina Supreme Court has recognized that conviction and sentencing or conviction and acquittal of an offense require
the prohibition from being subsequently indicted, convicted, or sentenced a second time for that same offense. The supreme court has
not limited this to direct prosecution, but has extended the protection
to include subsequent indictment, conviction, or sentencing for a
charge of which the predicate offense is an essential element. 1 3 With
the habitual misdemeanor statutes, defendants are convicted and sentenced for the crime of impaired driving in violation of North Carolina
General Statute § 20-401(24a)." 4 The State subsequently relies upon
this conviction as an essential element in order to punish the defendant under the habitual impaired driving statute.
The distinction between substantive and status offense is crucial
to the analysis. Were the habitual impaired driving capable of creating
only a status for punishment enhancement, the defendant would not
be subjected to double jeopardy. The status element would merely
serve to use the prior convictions to justify elevating the misdemeanor
offense to felony punishment status.
However, North Carolina courts have consistently held the habitual impaired driving and the habitual misdemeanor assault statutes to
create and independently support a substantive criminal offense. Consequentially, the prior convictions are essential elements of the felony
offense. The prior convictions do not serve as justifications for sentence enhancement. Rather, they establish a criminal offense. Therefore, a defendant's prior convictions subject him to new jeopardy.
Xl.

SOLUTIONS

North Carolina's inflexible stance regarding recidivist behavior is
justified. However, the State currently relies on statutes that are
stricken with constitutional violations. Fortunately, there are alternative statutory procedures that allow for enhanced punishment of recidivists while at the same time complying with the constitutional
guarantee of protection against double jeopardy. For example, the
North Carolina Habitual Felons Act fully complies with double jeopardy protections. The legislature could amend the habitual misdemeanor assault and habitual impaired driving statutes so that
113. State v. Midyette, 270 N.C. 229 (1967), overruled on other grounds, State v.
Gardner, 315 N.C. 444 (1986).
114. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-138.5 (1999).
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violations will create a punishment enhancement status. As previously discussed, status based recidivist statutes are held to be constitutional throughout the American judicial system. A statutory
amendment could create a status of being a habitual impaired driver or
a habitual perpetrator of assault. This would justify the enhancement
of punishment for subsequent criminal convictions incurred following
the imposition of the status.
XII.

CONCLUSION

Recidivist legislation undoubtedly comprises an essential element
of American criminal law. When properly drafted and applied, the
twin aims of deterring criminal behavior and punishing repeat offenders more severely are achieved. The goals of enhanced punishment for
repeat offenders are legitimate. As recidivist behavior continues to
increase, so too will the application of recidivist statutes. For that reason, it is critical that recidivist statutes do not violate the guarantees of
the United States Constitution.
Habitual assault and habitual impaired driving present serious
problems. North Carolina's interest in punishing those who repeatedly engage in criminal conduct is justified. In order to insure the
validity of recidivist convictions, statutes must comply with constitutional guarantees. Presently, the North Carolina habitual misdemeanor assault and habitual impaired driving statutes do not comply
with constitutional guarantees. Fortunately, the Legislature has curative means at its disposal. Amending the existing statutory language
that creates a substantive offense in these two recidivist statutes so
that punishment enhancement status is created instead, would make
these statutes conform to constitutional mandates. Such amendments
would also continue to recognize the goals of punishing repeat offenders through elevated punishment structures. Although no court as of
yet has pronounced the habitual misdemeanor assault or habitual
impaired driving statutes to be unconstitutional, such a holding is
imminent.
Jason White
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